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Abstract
Partisan dealignment has been frequently advanced as a pivotal driver of the personalization of voting behavior. As voters’
long-term attachments with parties eroded, it is argued that partisanship has lost importance to short-term factors, like
voters’ evaluations of party leaders. Such theoretical reasoning has been applied recurrently in research dedicated to
explaining vote choice. However, we hypothesize that dealignment can downplay partisanship’s impact vis-à-vis leaders in
the same way regarding turnout decisions. This article aims at demonstrating the importance of voters’ evaluations of
party leaders in their probability to turn out in parliamentary elections through a novel data set pooling 52 national
election surveys from 13 Western European parliamentary democracies between 1974 and 2016. The results confirm the
increasing relevance of leaders in explaining turnout decisions and a decline of partisanship’s mobilizing ability. These
trends are further accentuated among individuals with a television-dominated media diet, demonstrating the role of media
change in driving this process.
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Introduction
Political leaders have become important actors for the out-
come of elections even in parliamentary democracies
(Bean and Mughan, 1989). Leaders are no longer perceived
by voters as mere party figureheads, they matter as political
actors on their own, as worthy of assessment as many other
factors when deciding who to cast a vote for. As the erosion
of cleavage-based voting emptied much of Western polit-
ical parties’ loyal support base, vote choice is now claimed
to be less influenced by long-standing partisan attachments
and increasingly impacted by evaluations of the leaders
running for election (Garzia, 2014; McAllister, 2007). Such
transformations fit into what has been designated as the
personalization of politics, a process describing the increas-
ing relevance of individual political actors at the expense of
collective political organizations such as political parties
(Rahat and Sheafer, 2007).
Personalization may be found in different political are-
nas: institutions, media, and individuals’ political behavior
(Pedersen and Rahat, this issue). This article concentrates
on the behavioral arena and specifically the personalization
of voting decisions, designating a higher consideration of
individual political actors in the mechanisms guiding vot-
ers’ political participation. Importantly, personalization
may take place at different levels (Pedersen and Rahat, this
issue) being either centralized or decentralized (Balmas
et al., 2014). The first concerns a type of personalization
occurring at the top of parties’ structures, more specifically
at the leadership positions. Contrarily, decentralized perso-
nalization corresponds to a greater relevance of politicians
who are not party or executive leaders, such as candidates,
members of parliament, or ministers. Given that it
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explicitly focuses on party leaders’ effects on the vote, this
study explicitly explores centralized personalization.
The concept of personalization has not been received
without controversy—in particular, the very notion of
personalization as a process, implying the progressive
enfeebling of political parties as collective bodies, whereas
individual political actors became more relevant in the
political arena. By this prism, a few studies have challenged
the existence of a personalization in its multiple dimensions
(Karvonen, 2010; King, 2002; Kriesi, 2012) or, more con-
cretely, the claim that leaders have become more impor-
tant in the voting calculus than ever before (Curtice and
Holmberg, 2005; Holmberg and Oscarsson, 2011).
Despite these examples of mixed evidence, stemming
largely from varying methodological approaches, and lim-
ited scope of analysis, more recent pieces of evidence
relying on larger data sets seem to converge in support
of a personalization of voting behavior (Garzia, 2014;
Garzia et al., 2018; Lobo and Curtice, 2014; Rahat and
Kenig, 2018).
Two sets of sociopolitical developments are claimed to
be at the core of the emergence of this phenomenon. First,
the transformations in the structure of mass communication
in Western societies brought about by the massification of
television as primary source of political information. The
audiovisual character of televised communication primes
voters with images of individual political actors at the
expense of relatively more abstract ideological factors
(Sartori, 1989). Voters are now more responsive to visual
imagery and nonverbal information, and form personality
perceptions of the leaders which are used as cues to eval-
uate them, ultimately influencing their voting decisions—
in some cases, such effects even overwhelm those stem-
ming from issue-related considerations (Druckman, 2003;
Rosenberg et al., 1986; Todorov et al., 2005). Political
parties have adapted their campaigns in response to these
new personality-based medium and placed leaders at the
forefront of a new type of personalized political communi-
cation (Hayes, 2009).
Second, the postwar sociopolitical changes decisively
contributed to the erosion of the cleavages underlying
structural partisan alignments. The rise of the Welfare State
reduced the potential for political conflict by reducing
inequality, promoting higher levels of general well-being,
and providing citizens with a safety net. The postwar period
has also led to an expansion of educational resources,
increasing levels of interest in politics and political knowl-
edge among the general population, thus decreasing indi-
viduals’ dependency on partisan cues to interpret and
process political phenomena. This new setting downplayed
party mobilization in favor of what has been designated as
cognitive mobilization (Dalton, 2007).
A major consequence of these processes has been the
steady decline of partisan attachments in advanced indus-
trial democracies since the 1970s (Dalton, 2000). The
social and political context of the second half of the 20th
century has decisively contributed to downplaying the role
of partisanship and to highlighting the importance of party
leaders as short-term drivers of voting behavior (Garzia,
2014). Partisanship is considered one of the most important
drivers of electoral participation at the individual level
(Bartels, 2000; Budge and Farlie, 2010; Clarke et al.,
2004; Heath et al., 1985). Indeed, the legacy of psycholo-
gical models has conferred to attitudes and psychological
predispositions toward political parties a paramount role in
the explanation of voters’ turnout decisions (Campbell
et al., 1960, 1966). This stream of literature posits that
individuals are largely driven to the polls by their long-
standing affective bonds with political parties. Beyond act-
ing as a key element of political identity in driving turnout,
partisanship is also claimed to fulfill a functional role for
many citizens, serving as a perceptual screen for otherwise
too complex political phenomena. The same sort of reason-
ing is accompanied by rational choice accounts of party
identification (Fiorina, 1981, 1990). As such, partisanship
constitutes a central feature of party mobilization. Dalton
(2000: 21) synthesizes partisanship’s impact on turnout
noting that “partisans are more easily mobilized by polit-
ical parties to turn out at the polls, and feel a stronger
sense of personal motivation to support their preferred
parties and candidates.” In their comparative study of
seven democracies, also Budge and Farlie (2010: 114)
found it to be the variable with “the most consistent and
strongest relationship with turnout.” Hence, partisanship
has been widely recognized as a core element of party
mobilization in Western democracies but as the number
of partisans has steadily decreased over the last decades,
other factors may be becoming increasingly relevant in
explaining turnout decisions.
Could party leaders have filled the gap left vacant by
partisanship in driving voters to the ballot box? In other
words, is party mobilization as important today as it once
were, or as with vote choice, has its chief role in explaining
vote choice been replaced by short-term forces such as
evaluations of party leaders in the current context of perso-
nalized politics? This study aims at answering these ques-
tions by asserting whether voters’ evaluations of party
leaders matter for turnout decisions not only in presidential
but now also in increasingly personalized parliamentary
democracies. Further, it aims at demonstrating that the
importance of leader evaluations for turnout decisions links
to a process of partisan dealignment and media change
through which an overtime decrease in party mobilization
(i.e. partisanship’s ability to bring voters to the ballot box)
corresponds to an increase in leader mobilization. In addi-
tion, we explore the potential mechanisms through which
leaders may exert a mobilizing effect.
Our empirical analysis makes use of an original data set
pooling 52 national election studies from 13 Western Eur-
opean democracies in the period 1974–2016. This large
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pool of data allows to track down the development of these
processes over time and to compare across a wide range of
parliamentary democracies. In doing so, this study goes
beyond previous exploratory research on leader effects on
turnout which has adopted a restricted time frame and
lacked contextual variation and important explanatory
variables.
Leader effects on turnout: Theory and measurement
The American literature has long established that evalua-
tions of presidential candidates do matter for turnout deci-
sions (Brody and Grofman, 1982; Weisberg and Grofman,
1981; Zipp, 1985). The characteristics of presidential sys-
tems put individual actors on the spotlight of political and
media discourse. In fact, even what is perhaps the most
skeptical theoretical account of the independent effect of
candidates on voting behavior recognizes that short-term
sources of political stimulation are the primary cause of
variation in electoral turnout, such as “popular candidates
[who] may stimulate widespread enthusiasm” (Campbell
et al., 1966: 41).
The literature on leader effects in US presidential elec-
tions, however, is not motivated by the same sociopolitical
changes leading to the personalization of politics in parlia-
mentary systems. The architecture of presidential systems
favors a candidate-centered type of politics (Wattenberg,
1991) particularly in the heavily mediatized and television-
dominated American context, so it has always come as
straightforward that leaders should play a role not only in
vote choice but also in electoral mobilization. Therefore,
studies on leader effects in the United States largely pre-
cede the transformations described in the previous section,
going back to classic theoretical traditions of studying vot-
ing behavior, namely, psychological affection and rational
choice theory. The investigation of the mechanisms under-
lying leader effects on turnout has sparked empirical
research much throughout the 1970/1980s (Brody and
Grofman, 1982; Brody and Page, 1973; Weisberg and
Grofman, 1981). Although such literature may not be very
informative about the reasons why leader mobilization
could have taken the space of partisan mobilization in par-
liamentary democracies, it is enlightening about the condi-
tions and mechanisms through which political leaders
impact turnout decisions and, in specific, about how to
effectively measure these effects.
Michigan’s sociopsychological models highlight the
importance of attitudinal and psychological predispositions
in guiding voting behavior (Campbell et al., 1960, 1966).
Voting is conceived as a result of psychological affection,
and it is precisely this sense of attachment that renders the
notion of party identification so important. Under this the-
oretical framework, voters choose who to vote for (or
choose whether to cast a vote or not in the first place)
provided they are psychologically involved with any of the
runners for election. Therefore, in order to be mobilized to
vote, individuals must acknowledge or expect a psycholo-
gical benefit from participation. Applying this reasoning to
leader effects on turnout, this means that individuals’
attraction to one or more of the leaders is a necessary pre-
condition for participation. If they feel negative about all of
the leaders, they will eventually lack the psychological
involvement necessary to motivate electoral participation.
This type of abstention has been named in the literature as
abstention by alienation (Brody and Grofman, 1982; Brody
and Page, 1973; Weisberg and Grofman, 1981) and stems
from “disgust with the alternatives proffered by the parties”
(Converse, 1966: 24). Interestingly, this type of abstention
can be linked to what has been described as “negative
personalization,” reflecting the negative appeal of the lead-
ers running for election (Pruysers and Cross, 2016; see also
Helboe-Pedersen and Rahat in this special issue).
Differently from social-psychological approaches,
rational choice models perceive voting as a function of
an individual cost–benefit analysis (Downs, 1957). Since
voting is an eminently irrational endeavor—given the
extreme unlikelihood of an individual’s vote affecting elec-
toral outcomes and the opportunity costs associated with
the act of voting—individuals must find incentives or
anticipate some personal benefits from participation. The
decision to vote is thus subject to a calculation in which
the expected utilities from casting a ballot compensate the
costs. For leader effects, this implies that there must be an
expected differential between leaders recognized by vot-
ers for them to attach a degree of importance to the choice
between leaders. If the voter perceives no differences
between the alternatives presented, then the expected dif-
ferential is zero. Being indifferent to who wins the contest
would then lead the rational voter to abstain because there
is no return from electoral participation (Downs, 1957:
39).1 Based on existing theorization, this designates
abstention by indifference, resulting from a “perceived
lack of choice between the candidates” (Brody and Page,
1973: 2).2
Both theories are hardly exclusionary. Campbell et al.
(1966: 41) acknowledges the importance of the differentiat-
ing between party–leader alternatives in avoiding absten-
tion by indifference. Conversely, the Downsian model
posits that an alienated individual who feels negative about
all leaders will be indifferent because he or she expects no
utility from voting.
Despite the reported long-standing tradition in the
American context, leader evaluations have not yet captured
due scholarly attention regarding their effect on turnout in
parliamentary elections. In this article, we argue that this
chief role of partisanship in driving electoral participation
in West European parliamentary systems has been chal-
lenged by the very same sociopolitical transformations that
have paved the way for the personalization of politics. As
partisan dealignment dramatically decreased the number of
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individuals reporting to identify with a political party, this
growing share of non-identifiers is no longer subject to
mobilization in terms of partisan attachments. While the
number of non-identifiers increases, so does the room for
other factors to intervene as drivers of turnout. Dealign-
ment is claimed to carry a shift from long-term to short-
term determinants of voting behavior. Rather than relying
on their once stable affective bonds with political parties or
on patterns of social mobilization rooted in class or group
belongings, voters are increasingly making their decisions
individually and on-the-run, taking into account short-term
election-specific aspects. In this regard, media change and
the context of personalized politics turns party leaders into
privileged actors. In other words, as media change and
partisan dealignment led to the personalization of vote
choice, these same processes have had similar effects on
turnout by creating a favorable context for a higher rele-
vance of party leader assessments. A setting dominated by
party mobilization may be followed by a new paradigm of
leader mobilization.
It has been claimed that West European democracies
have increasingly come to resemble presidential systems’
modus operandi, thus “presidentializing” what once were
pure parliamentary systems (Poguntke and Webb, 2005).
For these reasons, evaluations of party leaders may now
play a role in voter turnout among the European electorate
as well. Yet, the relationship between the personalization of
politics and turnout has been overlooked in the literature.
The restricted number of previous studies applying this
theoretical framework to West European parliamentary
democracies indeed finds an effect of leader evaluations
on voters’ turnout decisions. Silva and Costa (2019) found
an effect of warmth personality traits’ evaluations of party
leaders on voters’ turnout decisions. Silva’s (2018) large-N
comparative analysis shows the effects of leaders on turn-
out to be stronger among dealigned voters. However, these
studies do not address the totality of the puzzle laid out so
far. First, they focus on restricted time periods, impeding
longitudinal inferences about the temporal development of
the hypothesized decrease in party mobilization and
increase in leader mobilization. Second, they do not discuss
the mechanisms through which leaders may impact turnout
decisions. Third, they do not take into account the role of
the transformations in the structure of mass communication
in the longitudinal development of this process.
In this article, we depart from both psychological affec-
tion and rational choice theories to assess leader effects on
turnout decisions in West European parliamentary democ-
racies. In sum, one can expect that when voters have a
strong sense of psychological affection toward a leader
and/or are able to identify clearly a preferred leader choice
vis-à-vis the alternative ones, leaders are more likely to
produce a mobilization effect on electoral participation.
With these expectations in mind, the type of effects leaders
exert on turnout can be posed in terms of effects on
abstention by alienation or indifference. The following
hypothesizes will guide the empirical analysis:
H1: Voters’ evaluations of party leaders have an effect
on their decisions to turn out.
H2: There has been an increase across time in the effect
of voters’ evaluations of party leaders vis-à-vis the
effects of partisanship on turnout decisions.
H3: A televised-based media diet potentiates leader
effects and dampers partisanship effects on turnout.
Data and methods
This study relies on a large-scale harmonization project
pooling 52 distinct national election studies from 13 West-
ern European parliamentary democracies conducted in the
period 1974–2016. Already existing comparative data sets
have either neglected leader evaluations (i.e. European
Election Study) or voters’ exposure to political information
in the media (i.e. Comparative Study of Electoral Systems),
thus making this pooled solution the best viable option to
answer the research questions at hands. The current set of
elections includes every election study featuring the key
variables of interest to conduct this analysis. Our data set
allows for the first ever longitudinal account of the impact
of leader evaluations on turnout decisions, spanning for
over 40 years’ worth of elections surveys. While an ideal
analysis of the phenomenon would go back to the mid-20th
century (Karvonen, 2010), available survey data do not
reach so far back in time. The selection of countries applied
the following set of pre-established criteria. First, the sam-
ple was restricted to parliamentary democracies, as this is
where a trend toward an increase in the importance of party
leaders is expected to occur—in presidential systems, lead-
ers have always been pivotal. Second, we focus exclusively
on Western European countries, as they have longer expe-
rience with democratic elections (and national election
study projects). Finally, among these countries, we only
included the studies featuring party leader evaluations,
party identification, and variables reporting voters’ expo-
sure to political information in the media, as these are our
key independent variables. Table 1 summarizes the number
of studies included for each of the countries under analysis.
Except for the British electoral studies, which go back to
the mid-1970s, a comparative assessment is only made
possible in the 1980s.3 The different time periods across
countries are controlled for in our statistical models. How-
ever, by being unable to consider the entire time trend
theoretically relevant for the personalization of politics the-
sis (since the 1960s), and due to the shorter time span
considered in many of the countries in our sample, the
analysis is likely to underestimate the effects of leaders
on turnout. On these grounds, our findings remain on the
conservative side.
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The dependent variable dichotomizes turnout into 1:
individuals who declare to have cast a vote; and 0: other-
wise. Sociodemographic controls include age (numeric),
gender (0: male; 1: female), educational level (as measured
by ISCED 1997 categories), religiosity (1: never goes to
church/not at all religious; 2: less than once a month/not
very religious; 3: once a month or more/somewhat reli-
gious; 4: once a week or more/very religious), and union
membership (0: not a member; 1: member). Interest in
politics was coded on a four-point scale (1 ¼ not at all
interested; 2 ¼ not very interested; 3 ¼ fairly interested;
4 ¼ very interested). Ideology was recoded from an
original 0 (Right) to 10 (Left) scale into the following:
0. don’t know/don’t answer; 1. far-left; 2. center-left; 3.
center; 4. center-right; 5. far-right.4
Leader evaluations are measured through a feeling ther-
mometer where 0 stands for “does not like the party leader”
and 10 for “likes the party leader”—this is the basis for the
key independent variables constructed to measure leader
effects on turnout (see Table A8 in Online Appendix for
detailed question wording and recoding strategy). Partisan-
ship is dichotomized into 1: individuals who identify with a
political party; and 0: individuals who do not identify with
any political party.
The long-term comparative nature of our data set carries
the caveat of depending on the availability of indicators
across a relatively large number of countries and across a
wide time period. This imposes restrictions on the breadth
of controls which may be included in the model without
sacrificing the cross-time comparative virtues of the data
set. We acknowledge the lack of relevant standard controls
used in individual-level turnout studies. However, the
inclusion of further controls would substantially hinder the
number of countries and time-points considered.
The characteristics of our data set also might raise
potential issues of comparability and of item consistency.
Namely, our measure for partisanship stems from different
questions applied to capture respondents’ political identity
in the multiple national election study projects. Neverthe-
less, we still operate under conditions of conceptual homo-
geneity, since all national election studies included in our
data set tapped respondents’ feelings of closeness to a polit-
ical party as an indicator of a long-term affective relation-
ship with a political party.
A similar approach holds for our measures of voters’
exposure to political information in the media (details on
the question wording and recoding procedure for these
variables are available for newspapers and television in
Tables A9 and A10, respectively, in Online Appendix).
The harmonization of these variables followed the same
principle of conceptual homogeneity, as they (a) indicate
a frequency of media usage, (b) tap media usage to collect
political information, and (c) capture this consumption for
both TV and newspapers. Different measurement scales
were allowed in order to expand the pool of election studies
considered, spanning from more refined measures (e.g. ask-
ing subjects to report news exposure on a given media in
number of days per week) to minimally satisfactory scales
(e.g. four values ranging from “never” to “everyday”).
This minimum common denominator approach is
grounded on the idea that every respondent can be classi-
fied in terms of what media represents their most important
source of political information. While in the remaining
models, we use the raw measures of exposure to political
information in the newspapers, and on television as con-
trols (measuring frequency of exposition to each medium in
the following scale: 1¼ always/6–7 days a week; 2¼ often/
3–5 days a week; 3 ¼ rarely/1–2 days a week; 4 ¼ never/0
days a week), we use a more robust and complex measure
to test the proposition of hypothesis 3. In this case, we are
particularly interested in the composition rather than the
mere quantity of media usage. Such an approach allows for
the consideration of possible overlaps in exposure to dif-
ferent media for political information, as highly interested
citizens are likely to use more than one media source to
collect information about politics. Therefore, it is important
to take into account the consumption of multiple media
sources, as in such cases, the visual effects of heavy expo-
sure to television news may be counterbalanced by strong
newspaper reading. On the contrary, even occasional expo-
sure to televised political information may leave a strong
personalizing imprint on lowly interested citizens when not
counterbalanced by newspaper readership.5 Hence, follow-
ing Shehata and Strömback (2011), we posit that a more
refined measure of political information consumption is
required to account for multiple media diets, grounded on
potentially different degrees of newspaper/television con-
sumption as the source of political information. For this
purpose, we developed a modified version of their original
measure of newspaper- and television-centrism. While they
operationalize it as the difference between the average
amount of total newspaper reading minus the average
Table 1. Countries and election studies included in the analysis.
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Total 52
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amount of total television viewing for each of the countries
under analysis, we apply the same rationale to construct a
similar measure at the individual level. Individuals who are
more frequently exposed to political information on news-
papers than on television were assigned a value of 1
(newspaper-centric respondent), individuals reporting the
same frequency of news collection for newspapers and
television were assigned a value 0 (balanced consumption
of newspapers and television news), and individuals who
are more frequently exposed to political information on
television than on newspapers were assigned a value 1
(television-centric individuals). Noticeably, this approach
has the advantage of not carrying problems of news expo-
sure overreporting (Prior, 2009). This variable will be used
as a moderator for the effects of partisanship and leader
evaluations on turnout across time, as posed in hypothesis
3.
The effects of leaders on turnout are measured through a
set of variables tapping the two possible mechanisms found
in the literature, according to which leaders may have an
impact on turnout. The assessment of alienation is carried
using the same methodology employed by Brody and Page
(1973), as well as Weisberg and Grofman (1981), that is,
considering respondents’ attitudes toward their most liked
leader. In this case, the higher a respondent rates their most
liked leader, the more likely she is to be psychologically
mobilized by the leader’s appeal and turnout. If even the
respondent’s preferred leader rates poorly, she is likely to
abstain by alienation. On the other hand, the operationali-
zation of indifference implies a transformation of the
original feeling thermometer variable into a new one taking
the rating of the most liked leader and subtracting from it
the ratings of the second most liked leader, third most liked
leader, and so on, adding up the differences between each
pair (Baltz and Nevitte, 2017). This can be illustrated by the
following equation, where H is the term for the level of net
differential affect toward the l leaders.
H ¼ ð‘1  ‘2Þ þ ð‘1  ‘3Þ þ ð‘1  ‘4Þ þ . . . þ ð‘1  ‘wÞ
In theory, H has value 0 in case of complete indifference
between all party leaders, and has no upper boundary,
depending on the number of parties/leaders running for
election in a given country at a given point in time. This
variable captures the extent to which subjects acknowledge
differences between the leaders running for election: the
higher the difference (H), the more likely the individual
is to turn out. Each hypothesis will be thus tested both in
terms of leaders’ impact on turnout through reduction of
abstention by alienation and indifference.
Results
To assess whether leaders do have an impact on turnout
decisions, we proceed by modeling the importance of vot-
ers’ evaluations of party leaders on the probability to turn
out in parliamentary elections in West European democra-
cies. We do so by estimating hierarchical logistic regres-
sion models with random intercepts for each election study.
In this way, we control for unobserved heterogeneity across
countries and across time within countries. The results of
the models are presented in Table 2. In model 1, the effects
of leader evaluations on tackling abstention by alienation
were estimated using the most liked leader measurement. In
model 2, the effects of leaders on tackling abstention by
indifference were estimated using the sum of the differ-
ences between leaders (H). 6
The results by and large confirm the existence of a pos-
itive effect of voters’ evaluations of party leaders on their
probability to turn out. Regardless of the measures adopted,
leaders have a meaningful impact on voters’ turnout deci-
sions. However, the H measure, capturing the impact of the
differences between leaders on reducing abstention by
indifference, appears to have a more substantial effect.
Noticeably, the effect size of both variables is comparable
to that of partisanship. This comes as particularly evident
through an analysis of their marginal effects in Figure 1.
Using a most liked leader measurement, the impact of
voters’ evaluations of leaders is almost the same size of
partisanship effects. However, using the H measurement,
the effect of leaders becomes slightly larger than partisan-
ship’s. Given the discussed long-standing relevance of par-
tisanship as a cornerstone predictor in individual-level
turnout models, its equally relevant impact vis-à-vis leader
evaluations is revealing about the importance of the lead-
ers. Indeed, they can exert a significant impact on reducing
both abstention by indifference and alienation, thus prov-
ing to be important actors in mobilizing individuals for
electoral participation. These results demonstrate that (a)
appealing leaders can motivate individuals to turn out,
impeding abstention by alienation, and (b) whenever voters
identify differences in their evaluations of leaders, their
reduced indifference yields an increased probability to turn
out. Both these outcomes provide evidence in favor of con-
firming hypothesis 1.7
A fundamental aspect of the personalization of politics
thesis is its longitudinal, temporal dimension. It is essen-
tially what distinguishes a context of personalization from a
context of personalized politics. Personalization designates
a diachronic process through which individual political
actors came to matter more over time while the centrality
of the political group declines over the same period (Rahat
and Kenig, 2018). Therefore, the claim that there has been a
personalization of voter turnout is contingent on the
demonstration of empirical evidence demonstrating an
increase over time in leader effects on turnout. The exis-
tence of such longitudinal trend is investigated through
models 3 and 4 in Table 2 by interacting both partisanship
and, alternatively, each of the leader evaluation measures
with the year in which every election took place. Our initial
expectations are confirmed by the negative significant
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interaction between partisanship and year and the positive
significant interaction between both measures of leader
evaluations and year.8
All our models were subject to leave-one-out-cross-
validation (LOOCV) tests (see robustness section below
for additional details). These tests consist of rerunning the
regressions multiples times by excluding one country from
the sample at the time, to exclude that an outlier is driving
the results.9 Importantly, in model 4, referring to the
H measure of leader effects on abstention by indifference,
the cross-time interactions did not hold after this test. Thus,
the results for indifference can be considered not robust.
Concerning model 3, the interaction between partisanship
and year is also not robust—the effect of partisanship on
turnout is rather stable across this time period. The effects
of voters’ evaluations of their most liked leader on turnout,
however, are robust. For this reason, we have plotted the
marginal effects of these interactions exclusively for model
3, regarding the most liked leader measure for alienation
(Figure 2).
Figure 2 is illustrative of the reverse trends of the rela-
tive decline of party mobilization and the steep increase of
leader mobilization since the mid-1970s. The impact of
voters’ evaluation of party leaders on turnout has been
noticeably growing over the period of analysis. At the same
time, while party mobilization can be claimed not to have
declined over this time period, it has lost much relative
importance as a driver of turnout decisions. In other words,
we are not witnessing an actual decline of partisanship’s
effects over time but rather a decline of its relative impact
vis-à-vis the growing effect of leaders. While leaders
Table 2. The impact of voters’ evaluations of party leaders on turnout decisions—effects on abstention by alienation and indifference:
HLM estimation.
1 2 3 4
Age 0.007*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001)
Gender 0.029 (0.018) 0.059** (0.017) 0.028 (0.018) 0.058** (0.017)
Education 0.160*** (0.014) 0.118*** (0.013) 0.160*** (0.014) 0.117*** (0.013)
Religiosity 0.015 (0.009) 0.023* (0.009) 0.014 (0.009) 0.023* (0.009)
Union membership 0.259*** (0.026) 0.258*** (0.025) 0.259*** (0.026) 0.259*** (0.025)
Interest in politics 0.511*** (0.019) 0.517*** (0.018) 0.509*** (0.019) 0.518*** (0.018)
Ideology 0.137*** (0.006) 0.184*** (0.006) 0.136*** (0.006) 0.184*** (0.006)
Television 0.117*** (0.009) 0.136*** (0.009) 0.115*** (0.009) 0.135*** (0.009)
Newspapers 0.085*** (0.009) 0.069*** (0.009) 0.085*** (0.009) 0.069*** (0.009)
Partisanship 0.450*** (0.010) 0.478*** (0.009) 0.561*** (0.036) 0.597*** (0.035)
Leaders: Most liked leader 0.380*** (0.009) — 0.258*** (0.024) —
Leaders: Difference between leaders (H) — 0.517*** (0.012) — 0.369*** (0.038)
Leaders: Most Liked Leader  Year — — 0.004*** (0.001) —
Leaders: Difference Between Leaders (H)  Year — — — 0.005*** (0.001)
Partisanship  Year — — 0.003** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001)
Year — — 0.023 (0.012) 0.026* (0.013)
Constant 0.269*** (0.149) 0.025 (0.155) 0.901* (0.363) 0.740* (0.380)
Log-likelihood 41568.04 45016.10 41548.58 45000.37
Wald w2 9432.80 10819.16 9436.82 10838.80
AIC 83162.08 90058.2 83129.15 90032.75
BIC 83286.63 90183.31 83282.45 90186.73
N (elections) 52 52 52 52
N (observations) 107,037 111,697 107,037 111,697
Note: HLM: hierarchical logit model; AIC: Akaike Information Criterion; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion. Table entries are HLM coefficients with a
random intercept for each election study in our sample. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The coefficients of partisanship and leader evaluations
variables are standardized.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Figure 1. Party and leader effects on turnout: comparison of the
marginal effects of partisanship and both measurements of leader
effects-estimates from models 1 and 2 of Table 2
Plotted using plotplain graphic scheme (Bischof, 2017).
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become more important for turnout decisions, partisanship
effects do not follow that trend and have even been sur-
passed by the impact of voters’ evaluations of leaders. It
adds that much of partisanship’s impact may actually be the
result of processes of identification through leader sympa-
thies, as previous research has documented (Garzia, 2013).
As such, the relative stability of the impact of partisanship
may be overestimated.
The fact that this trend holds only for the most liked
leader measure is revealing about the potential of leaders
as actors able to counter the developing trends of aliena-
tion, political apathy, and overall disengagement. Leaders
can be active mobilizing forces in tackling abstention by
alienation. Overall, these results support hypothesis 2 with
regard to the most liked leader measure for leader effects on
abstention by alienation.
Finally, we aimed at ascertaining the role of individuals’
media diet in this process. Mediatization is pointed as a
cause of the personalization of politics. Television is a
personality-based medium which primes individual politi-
cal actors at the expenses of abstract concepts, political
programs, or ideologies. In this way, different media diets
may promote the individual consideration of distinct
aspects for electoral participation. Such a possibility is
investigated in the models featured in Table 3 using the
already presented measures of newspapers-/television-
centrism. The sample was split for each measure of leader
effects into individuals who have a newspaper-centered
media diet (i.e. report being more frequently exposed to
political information in the newspapers than on television),
or who have a balanced diet (i.e. report being equally
exposed to both mediums)10—models 1 and 3, respec-
tively; and individuals with a television-centric media diet
(i.e. report being more frequently exposed to political infor-
mation on television than in the newspapers)—models 2
and 4, respectively. The same time-interaction models were
run on both samples to capture the development of the
process over time.11
Models 1 and 3 refer to newspaper-centric individuals.
In model 1, featuring the most liked leader measure of
leader effects, none of the cross-time interactions is signif-
icant. As for model 3, featuring the H measure of leader
effects, the interactions are significant in the same direction
as in previous models.
Models 2 and 4 include television-centric individuals. In
both these models, regardless of the measure of leader
effects adopted, there is a significant interaction term in
the expected direction, confirming the previous results on
the longitudinal assessment of personalization: there is a
decrease over time on the relative impact of partisanship
and an increase over time on the impact of voters’ evalua-
tions of party leaders on turnout. However, again, the
results of models 3 and 4, for the H measure of leader
effects, did not pass the LOOCV tests and therefore are
not robust. Based on this result, we cannot conclude that
mediatization fosters leader effects on abstention by indif-
ference. Models 1 and 2 however, referring to abstention
by alienation, are robust and therefore we proceed with
plotting the marginal effects for the interactions terms for
both newspaper-centric and television-centric individuals
(Figure 3 for most liked leader measure).
While the increase in leader effects is clear regardless
of the chosen model, once we concentrate on newspaper-
centric individuals, this increase is overshadowed by a
similar importance of partisan attachments over the same
period.
In contrast, the marginal interaction effects for
television-centric individuals clearly show, on the one
hand, a steeper increase in the effects of leaders across time
and, at the same time, a decrease in the impact of partisan-
ship toward the last decades of the time period. The deca-
lage of leader effects vis-à-vis partisanship effects stands
out in this setting. The differences across samples in the
longitudinal trends of leader and partisanship effects on
turnout support the thesis that exposure to political infor-
mation on television fosters leader effects over abstention
by alienations, fostering turnout and thus confirming the
proposition expressed in hypothesis 3.
Robustness
LOOCV tests. To address the possibility that an extreme case
might be driving our results, we carried LOOCV tests by
excluding one country at the time from our sample. The
results proved robust in every circumstance except for
those previously highlighted: all interaction models involv-
ing the H measure of leader effects on abstention by indif-
ference. Details on cross-validation tests are available in
Online Appendix (Figures A1 to A4).
Figure 2. Partisanship and leader effects on turnout across time:
marginal effects of the interaction between Partisanship  Year
and Most Liked Leader  Year.
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Table 3. The moderator role of media on the process of personalization of turnout: HLM estimation with split samples according to
respondents’ media diet.
Most liked leader H
Newspaper-centric Television-centric Newspaper-centric Television-centric
1 2 3 4
Age 0.006*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001)
Gender 0.000 (0.026) 0.058* (0.025) 0.030 (0.025) 0.087*** (0.024)
Education 0.142*** (0.019) 0.178*** (0.020) 0.104*** (0.018) 0.133*** (0.019)
Religiosity 0.017 (0.014) 0.004 (0.013) 0.030* (0.013) 0.010 (0.012)
Union membership 0.245*** (0.036) 0.285*** (0.038) 0.240*** (0.035) 0.290*** (0.037)
Interest in politics 0.516*** (0.028) 0.478*** (0.026) 0.533*** (0.027) 0.480*** (0.024)
Ideology 0.132*** (0.009) 0.140*** (0.008) 0.176*** (0.008) 0.191*** (0.008)
Television 0.055** (0.021) 0.053** (0.020) 0.057** (0.021) 0.068* (0.019)
Newspapers 0.162*** (0.022) 0.149*** (0.019) 0.164*** (0.022) 0.124*** (0.019)
Partisanship 0.498*** (0.050) 0.611** (0.054) 0.555*** (0.048) 0.627*** (0.052)
Leaders: Most liked leader 0.312 (.036) 0.212*** (0.033)
Leaders: Difference between leaders (H) 0.376* (0.059) 0.354*** (0.050)
Leaders: Most Liked Leader  Year 0.002 (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001)
Leaders: Difference Between Leaders (H)  Year 0.004* (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002)
Partisanship  Year 0.002 (0.001) 0.005** (0.002) 0.003 (0.001) 0.004** (0.002)
Year 0.023 (0.012) 0.022 (0.012) 0.027* (0.013) 0.025* (0.012)
Constant 0.985* (0.388) 0.970** (0.363) 0.798* (0.402) 0.797* (0.380)
Log-likelihood 19975.53 21866.48 21295.96 23688.62
Wald w2 4830.73 4527.34 5596.30 5130.75
AIC 39383.05 43764.95 42623.91 47409.23
BIC 39525.05 43907.36 42766.58 47552.33
N (elections) 52 52 52 52
N (observations) 52,828 54,209 55,091 56,606
Note: HLM: hierarchical logit model; AIC: Akaike Information Criterion; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion. Table entries are HLM coefficients with a
random intercept for each election study in our sample. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The coefficients of partisanship and leader evaluations
variables are standardized.
*p < .05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Figure 3. Partisanship and leader effects on turnout across time for newspaper- and television-centric individuals: marginal effects of
the interaction between Partisanship  Year, and Most Liked Leader  Year – models 1 and 2 of Table 3.
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Abstention by satisfaction. A third potential source of absten-
tion by satisfaction was advanced by Weisberg and Grof-
man (1981). This type of abstention occurs when the
subject is satisfied with all the major leaders. If there is
reasonable satisfaction with all the major alternatives pre-
sented, there is no incentive to vote—either way, the out-
come will please the subject. Abstention by satisfaction can
thus be perceived as a form of rational nonvoting. Note that
satisfaction can configure a subtype of abstention by indif-
ference: if all leaders are equally good, it is indifferent who
wins, hence the rational decision being to abstain. For this
reason, it was considered as a robustness test, rather than a
measure on its own. Satisfaction was operationalized by
calculating the average thermometer score of all leaders
running for election. If all leaders collect high ratings, the
average shall be high and the subject shall be satisfied with
any electoral outcome and thus not turn out. If at least some
leaders are poorly rated, the average shall be lower and the
subject can be said to be unsatisfied and thus turn out to
signal its preferences.
The whole empirical analysis was replicated using this
measure. However, leader effects on abstention by satisfac-
tion were significant in the main effects model but not
significant in any of the interaction models tested. The
significant results for satisfaction can be consulted in Table
A1 of Online Appendix.
Discussion and conclusion
This article aimed at demonstrating the growing
importance of voters’ evaluations of party leaders for
individual-level turnout decisions within the current con-
text of partisan dealignment, mediatization, and personali-
zation of politics. Its conclusions challenge the dominant
status of partisanship as the most important predictor of
electoral participation. As fewer individuals have been
reporting a long-standing attachment to a political party,
these bonds are no longer able to explain electoral turnout
in the same degree as in the mid-20th century. Partisanship
now shares a prominent role in the explanation of
individual-level turnout with short-term predictors that
gained importance in the wake of the sociopolitical trans-
formation that marked the last decades in West European
democracies. The times in which “the decision to vote or
not in a given election [was] determined for the most part
by fairly stable attitudes toward the act of voting itself and
only secondarily affected by election-specific variables
(candidates, issues, etc.)” (Markus and Converse, 1979:
1057) seem now long gone. The results of this study show
that leader evaluations hold, at least, just as much impor-
tance as partisanship in predicting individual-level turnout.
What is more, it has been demonstrated that this is the result
of a diachronic process in which partisan mobilization has
been losing weight in relative terms and leader
mobilization has been gaining more relevance—a process
which can be designated as personalization of turnout.
In this way, the current study contributes to a much-
neglected dimension of behavioral personalization
related to the role of leaders in influencing not only vote
choice but also turnout decisions in currently highly
personalized parliamentary elections. This study
expands on previous exploratory research in three ways:
(a) by providing the first longitudinal account of the
phenomenon, demonstrating that this is a process of
personalization; (b) by shedding light on the role of
media change in the development of this process; and
(c) by exploring the potential mechanisms through
which leaders exert an impact on turnout.
The implications of such findings are particularly rele-
vant in the current context of disengagement, discontent,
and skepticism toward political parties (Mair, 2013). As
electoral turnout has been decreasing much throughout all
West European countries (Franklin, 2004; Wattenberg,
2002), a great deal of it has been attributed to the simulta-
neous decline in partisan attachments (Abramson and
Aldrich, 1982; Flickinger and Studlar, 1992; Heath,
2007). The confirmation that leaders have the ability to act
upon this problem by bringing voters to the ballot box
through their personal appeal is a positive countertrend.
Even if leaders’ mobilizing potential may not be suffi-
ciently effective to compensate for the entire decrease in
turnout registered over the last decades, our results show
that such decline could have been probably steeper had it
not been for the growing relevance of leaders’ assessments
in the voting calculus.
However, leader evaluations’ role in fostering turnout
may come with the caveat or more volatile turnout rates. If
turnout becomes increasingly dependent on the personal
characteristics of parties’ frontrunners, and electoral partic-
ipation more subject to the influence of short-term factors,
turnout rates may be subject to higher variation across
elections. Moreover, ultimately a personalization of voter
turnout may endanger the structuration of party competi-
tion by yielding electoral participation more dependent
on the selection of political personnel. For example, par-
ties may be incentivized to select leaders who are percei-
vable as particularly appealing to the electorate,
heightening their profile and power within party organi-
zation, and further personalize electoral campaigns to
give them more visibility and thus capitalize on their
mobilizing potential. In fact, these trends have already
been registered as a consequence of the personalization
of vote choice (Dalton, 2013).
The conclusions of this study open various possible ave-
nues for further research. For example, it would be inter-
esting to investigate whether the same conclusions are
extensible to decentralized personalization. Are evalua-
tions of local candidates also important in fostering turn-
out? As decentralized personalization becomes ever more
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pervasive in Western societies and voters are increasingly
given the possibility to actively select their representatives
as a consequence of personalization at the electoral system
level, there are grounds to hypothesize that similar findings
could be observable.
Another implication, and possible research focus, con-
cerns the role of negative leader evaluations in stimulating
turnout. Recent electoral contests, such as the 2017 French
Presidential Elections, have demonstrated how negativity
toward a party leader can motivate individuals to turn out
more (voting for a rival party) specifically to prevent that
leader from getting elected. As contemporary elections
become more tainted by affective polarization and negative
partisanship, we can expect such cases to become increas-
ingly frequent, anticipating a darker side on the personali-
zation of turnout.
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Notes
1. For variations of these propositions, see (Downs, 1957:
Ch. 14).
2. Weisberg and Grofman (1981) advance with a third type of
abstention, by satisfaction, which reflects an equally high
level of satisfaction with all candidates. This can be consid-
ered as a subtype of indifference: if all candidates are equally
good, it is indifferent who wins, hence, the rational decision
being to abstain. For this reason, we do not consider it as a
type on its own and do not include it in the hypothesis testing.
However, we do take it into account as a robustness test and
model it in Table A1 of Online Appendix.
3. Due to its distinct electoral system and since it is the only case
reaching back to the 1970s, all models were re-estimated
without the United Kingdom. The results hold virtually
unchanged. Please refer to Table A7 in Online Appendix.
4. Recoding procedure of 0–10 Left-Right scale: far left (0, 1,
2); center-left (3, 4); center (5); center-right (6, 7); far right
(8, 9, 10).
5. We do not claim that the direct appeal of leaders is necessa-
rily more effective among lowly interested individuals but
instead that, through the exclusive consumption of televised
political information, the visual stimuli may prime voters
with leaders’ images and indirectly affect their voting deci-
sions via a mediation procedure (Hayes, 2009; McLeod et al.,
1983; Mendelsohn, 1996). Existing studies provide only
mixed evidence as to the direct relationship between educa-
tion and political sophistication and leader effects on vote
choice (Bittner, 2011; Gidengil, 2011; Mughan, 2010; Rico,
2014). However, the influence of televised political informa-
tion particularly among the unsophisticated is grounded on a
substantial body of political communication literature (i.e.
Grabe and Bucy, 2009; Lenz and Lawson, 2011).
6. These models have been re-estimated using different mea-
sures of partisanship. For one thing, one could charge that
our partisanship variable does not tap the extent to which a
voter feels close to the party of their most liked leader. In
Table A2 of Online Appendix, we address this point by
adding an additional variable controlling for whether
respondents identify with such party. The strong patterns
of covariance between these two partisanship variables (r
¼ 0.65) signal that voters feel—more often than not—
close(r) to the party of their preferred leader. The results
hold virtually unchanged regarding our variables of interest.
To further test the robustness of our findings, we also relied
on a different measure of strength of partisanship, going
beyond our parsimonious binary operationalization. In
Table A4 of Online Appendix, we use a categorical measure
of strength of partisanship (0: does not identify with the
party of the most liked leader; 1: weakly identifies with the
party of the most liked leader; 2: moderately identifies with
the party of the most liked leader; 3: strongly identifies with
the party of the most liked leader), instead of the dichoto-
mous measure used in Table 2. Again, the results hold vir-
tually unchanged for our variables of interest: Note that in
every instance, the patterns of statistical significance of our
estimates remain unchanged.
7. We have also investigated the possibility of differentiated
effects for partisans and nonpartisans by adding to these mod-
els an interaction between partisanship and their respective
measurement of leader effects. Although the interaction terms
resulted negatively significant, suggesting that leaders matter
more for dealigned voters, such effects did not resist cross-
validation robustness tests. An outlier country was found to
be driving the results of these interactions, which turn not
significant once the outlier is excluded from the sample.
Therefore, feeling unconfident about the robustness of such
interactions, we decided to exclude it from the results.
8. All models interacting with year were re-estimated excluding
countries with a single data point (Austria, Denmark, and
Ireland). The results hold virtually unchanged. Please refer
to Table A6 in Online Appendix.
9. A less conservative version of this test was carried by exclud-
ing each election study at the time from the sample (instead of
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country). In this case, no outliers were found to be influencing
the results.
10. We decided to pool individuals with a balanced media diet
into the newspaper-centric category for two reasons. First,
newspaper-centric individuals are underrepresented in the
sample and, in this way, we can achieve a better balance
between both subsamples, which is desirable for estimation
purposes. Second, this poses a more robust test to the hypoth-
esis: individuals with a balanced media diet are at least
equally exposed to television and thus are more likely to be
led to prime leaders in disfavor of partisanship more than
purely newspaper-centric individuals. That is, this option is
more likely to overestimate the effects for the newspaper-
centric subsample than the alternative, and therefore it offers
a more conservative stance on the mediator influence of
exposure to televised news on leader effects on turnout.
11. As before, these models have been re-estimated using differ-
ent measures of partisanship. In Table A3 of Online Appen-
dix, we add an additional variable controlling for whether
respondents identify with the party of their most liked leader.
The results hold virtually unchanged regarding our variables
of interest. In Table A5 of Online Appendix, we also use a
measure of strength of partisanship (0: does not identify with
the party of the most liked leader; 1: weakly identifies with the
party of the most liked leader; 2: moderately identifies with
the party of the most liked leader; 3: strongly identifies with
the party of the most liked leader), instead of the dichotomous
measure used in Table 2. Again, the results hold virtually
unchanged for our variables of interest.
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